"Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers" by Madeleine K. Albright and William S. Cohen

This report was originally found posted on the USIP website at: http://www.usip.org/genocide_taskforce/index.html
The USIP's announcement of the release of the report ran as follows:
The Genocide Prevention Task Force was launched on November 13, 2007 and released its report to the public on December 8, 2008. It was jointly convened by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. It was funded by private foundations. Its goals were: (1) To spotlight genocide prevention as a national priority; and; (2) To develop practical policy recommendations to enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to respond to emerging threats of genocide and mass atrocities.
The report, which is entitled "Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers", asserts that genocide is preventable, and that making progress toward doing so begins with leadership and political will. The report provides 34 recommendations, starting with the need for high-level attention, standing institutional mechanisms, and strong international partnerships to respond to potential genocidal situations when they arise; it lays out a comprehensive approach, recommending improved early warning mechanisms, early action to prevent crises, timely diplomatic responses to emerging crises, greater preparedness to employ military options, and action to strengthen global norms and institutions.

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Beyond Genocide: An Ounce of Prevention, 2008 Year End Notes on Albright-Cohen Report

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Amy Fagin
20th Century Illuminations
Author of Beyond Genocide

Dear Colleagues,

For those of us in the genocide prevention community it can be small solace that increments towards prevention or aversion of atrocities are measured with diplomatic concessions or excruciatingly slow legal indictments with controversy swirling around the reasons for or against seemingly inconsequential efforts. It is important to remember two factors, great social movements can often span generations and that progress in an individual’s lifetime towards these goals may seem too little, too late. Especially when the crimes of humanity continue unchecked in our times and victims are perishing by the hundreds of thousands, our worthy goals can seem as ephemeral as a spring flower in a late winter storm.

With this understanding we continue to remind, cajole and mobilize against the tide of indifference with the underlying conviction that we will eventually bring the age of genocide to an end and create healthy, internationally recognized institutions that preserve human rights, dignity and respect for self determination.

Prevention is the key concept to aid in thwarting polarization and victimization of groups, wherever in the world these dangerous collective activities become apparent. To this effect two important documents have been created recently to aid policy makers and diplomats, activists and average citizens to take the responsibility of genocide prevention into our own hands so that we can all proudly take part in eradicating mass atrocity.

In November of this year the Genocide Prevention Task Force, a committee sponsored by the US Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy and The US Institute of Peace created a landmark comprehensive blueprint for prevention entitled: Preventing Genocide, A Blueprint for US Policymakers. Co chairs Madeleine Albright and William S. Cohen along with a 12 member committee have outlined central components, in a 174 page document, to challenge governments and citizens, worldwide to “stop allowing the unacceptable” and identify practical steps to enhance the capacity of the U.S. government to prevent and respond to genocide and mass atrocities.

An older report, called the Doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, was first released into the international community in 2001. This report examined when, if ever, it is appropriate for states to take coercive, and in particular, military action, against another state for the purpose of protecting populations at risk. The conclusions of the committee, led by Gareth Evans, former Foreign Minister of Australia and Mohamed Sahnoun, special Advisor to the UN Secretary-General, determined that: …” when a group of people are suffering from egregious acts of violence resulting from internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state where these crimes are taking place is unable or unwilling to act to prevent or protect its population, the international community has a moral duty to intervene or avert or halt these atrocities from occurring. “

In this year end note to colleagues, friends and fellow citizens I offer a synopsis the information in this newly released “Preventing Genocide:” report to help provide a concise overview for those of us who’s concerns prevent deeper examination of this important publication. Embedded in several chapters of this new document is the principal of “the responsibility to protect”. I have included a note about this earlier document due to the central role that it plays in forming the foundation of the Genocide Prevention Task Force’s recommendations.

Prevention of genocide is every citizen’s responsibility. With our collective efforts no one of us will carry a burden too heavy for a single individual. With the knowledge of the central components of these documents each of us will be better prepared to find opportunity to act in ways which promote genocide prevention. Our combined efforts can advance the commitment to eradicate genocide and shed the collective burden of helpless witnessing of willful murder on a mass scale.

In “Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Diplomacy” the document is organized into 6 chapters which make the claim that it “represents a comprehensive policy approach designed to ensure and effective response to genocide that is not held hostage to arguments over resources, intelligence, geography, sovereignty, or legal definition”.

The first chapter, “Leadership” is distinct from the others, recognizing the central role that leadership plays in the implementation of any ideas, proposed in the document, by the President, Congress and the American people. It is a specific call to action to all U.S. citizens, from the highest levels of government to the average citizen to leverage “all sources of relevant power and influence to effectively utilize the 2001 doctrine of “the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity”. First and foremost is fostering a goal of national priority by the President and leaders in Congress as to the importance of creating an “overarching inter-agency policy framework to devise and implement preventative strategies in recognition, analysis and response to perceived threats of genocide or mass atrocity” and to move past the current ad hoc nature of US response to these crises. This critical recommendation recognizes that the US government does not have “an established, coherent policy for preventing and responding to genocide and mass atrocities”. Along side of the policy recommendations is the monetary recommendation of $250 million in annual funds “channeled to the international affairs budget to finance initiatives to prevent genocide and mass atrocities in countries at risk”.

The following 5 chapters outline key recommendations as to formulating a strategic interagency policy, professional and citizen action framework for the President, Congress and the American people.

Chapter 2, “Early Warning” defines and elaborates on early warning and risk assessment systems as the first major element of a comprehensive strategy to prevent genocide. The task force recognizes that monitoring agencies currently exist and deliver prompt early warning statements to governments around the world of “at risk” regions but points out that these agencies are not coordinated with government institutions in a normative structure so that information received is too sporadic and disorganized to be effective. This chapter points out that improved mechanisms for early warning within government and improved coordination with international watch agencies, civil society, governments and experts is essential in creating effective and practical prevention strategies.

Chapter 3,” Early Prevention” advises that the judicial use of the tools of prevention can “successfully obviate the need for a much more difficult crisis response at a later stage.” The committee also cautions that prevention mechanisms do not automatically engender a one size fits all solution to at risk regions. Long term, context specific and multilateral commitments must be assessed, proposed and implemented before the underlying causes of conflict have reached stages where mass violence is imminent. Carrot and stick inducements are recommended to engage international regimes who are at risk of perpetrating mass violence. Power sharing, democratic transition, enhancing rule of law, economic and legal empowerment and free media are categorical strategies recommended for high-risk states…“to assist them in moving away from conflict and impunity towards accountability”.

Chapter 4 , “Preventative Diplomacy” acknowledges the “impeded effective action in the past” of U.S. efforts to halt and reverse escalating threats of mass atrocities and recommends a number of reforms to enhance responsiveness. Recognition of the calculations of “national interest” as an overriding influence on U.S. policy and action in contrast to our moral or humanitarian concerns with regards to at risk regions has led to diplomatic dilemmas where available policy choices have limited U.S effectiveness to save lives in conflict ridden situations. Successful diplomacy, largely based on the recommendations in chapters 2 and 3 are reiterated to tackle the “formidable barrier of national sovereignty and nonintervention. The language in the “responsibility to protect” document is again called upon as a legitimate basis for overriding national sovereignty for the purpose of preventative action. Decision making structures, coordinated policy planning, cooperative and coercive tools in the areas of diplomacy, economy, legal and military intervention are recommended as general strategic measures. A key component of this section is the recommendation of the establishment of an Atrocities Prevention Committee to meet bi-monthly to review status and coordinate preventative action and a crisis response plan for at risk regions.

Chapter 5, “Employing Military Options” tackles the major challenge of “determining whether, when and how to use military force to prevent or counter the escalation of violence to the level of genocide”. The task force urges leaders to “consider how military assets can be employed toward these objectives.” Citing the emphasis on prevention throughout the report, the committee acknowledges that the success of non military preventative measures may not always work. “Preventing or halting genocide may, at times, require the nonconsensual use of force”. The challenges inherent in military intervention include the dilemma of “taking sides” in determining genocide in the context of a broader armed conflict, and better understanding of the range of military options that can help prevent or stop genocide. It is recommended that the weighty decision to intervene militarily be considered in within “modern international legal and political structures”. The practicalities of assessing and utilizing an array of military operations with respect to basic public security and the intention of a mission are outlined in this chapter. The Department of Defense is specifically called upon to develop tools to prevent or respond to genocide where a “lack of training, doctrine and scenarios to prepare for a mission where force is required to protect civilians exists”. Coordinating military operations within the broader strategic framework of preparedness for genocide response is the critical recommendation of the task force for effective interruption of mass violence. Working with the five multinational organizations that have authority to use military force to help prevent and halt genocide is recommended to “combine political will, international legitimacy and operational capacity”. A clear strategy, international partners and ongoing vigorous diplomacy throughout intervention is critical for long term peace building in post conflict development.

Chapter 6, “International Action” implores the international community to consider the costs of inaction as the tragedies of mass atrocity have mounted in this century alone, to consume the lives of tens of millions. The committee places its report in the context of overwhelming “international indifference or inability to act effectively to prevent mass atrocities”. Furthermore, the committee asserts that with “a strong normative framework and capable international institutions” halting genocide is possible. Leadership within the U.S. government, U.N. Security Council, NATO and other internationally recognized peace keeping forces to advance the normative principle of “the responsibility to protect” is cited as the most important collective principle that can be used to assist individual states to prevent mass atrocity. Finally, the committee cites a “revolution in conscience” emerging around the world with the “responsibility to protect” being adopted in new human rights charters across South East Asian Nations and the European Union. Multinational corporations are recognizing their role in facilitating potential atrocities of at risk governments and the leverage they have in promoting responsible behavior. And the prosecutorial powers of the International Criminal Court to bring to justice the mass murderers of our time cannot be underestimated in its nascent power to deter future criminals and inspire judicial action in courts around the world. A bevy of recommendations to inaugurate and implement the content of this task force closes this chapter.

On a final note regarding “The Responsibility to Protect” (R2P): Since its first release in 2001 skepticism and criticism among diplomats, policy makers and experts has hindered the prompt implementation of the language of this doctrine. Its generality has been debated and criticized for its non-effectiveness in adequately providing practical implementation or a framework for action. Coming from the standpoint of an average citizen, the language of “responsibility to protect” is plain and sensible language which I would apply to myself under the rule of any government. I certainly expect my government to take “the responsibility to protect” my safety with regards to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. This is practical, ordinary language which appears to me to be a necessary first step in creating normative institutions which prevent the crimes of genocide. I am relieved that the Genocide Prevention Task Force has incorporated the proclamation of the R2P language into the core of its recommendations. The definition of “genocide” has undergone a similar rocky, disputed and easily dismissed path. 60 years after the first official declaration of the crimes of genocide by the UN the declaration of ‘the responsibility to protect” is becoming working language which can be utilized towards prevention of these crimes. Let us hope we do not have to wait another 60 years before we witness the eradication of genocide and the “responsibility to protect” as a universally accepted principle for governing bodies around the world protecting the lives of their citizens.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure!

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Critical Viewpoints on the Cohen-Albright Report by The Journal of the International Association of Genocide Scholars

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Genocide Studies and Prevention is the official journal of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. The journal published a special issue devoted to a critical analysis of the Albright-Cohen Report with strong negative and positive critiques. The following excerpt from the introduction to the issue prepared by Herb Hirsch, the editor of the issue who is also a co-editor of the journal, presents a summary of the viewpoints presented.

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The Genocide Prevention Task Force was officially launched in November 2007 by a consortium of non-governmental agencies—The US Holocaust Memorial Museum, The American Academy of Diplomacy, and The US Institute of Peace—under the joint chairmanship of Madeline Albright and William Cohen. Albright served as US Ambassador to the United Nations and then Secretary of State during the Clinton administration. Cohen was Secretary of Defense during Clinton’s second term. Participants in the Task Force, including consultants, comprised over fifty people with international, diplomatic, political, government, military, academic, humanitarian, and other relevant experience.

The Task Force’s mandate is explained in the title of its official report, Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. The Co-Chairs explain in their Foreword, “This report provides a blueprint that can enable the United States to take preventive action, along with international partners, to forestall the specter of future cases of genocide and mass atrocities. The world agrees that genocide is unacceptable and yet genocide and mass killings continue. Our challenge is to match words to deeds and stop allowing the unacceptable.”

Since the task force report was deemed by the editors to be an important event, we thought that we should invite a diverse set of commentaries from as many perspectives as possible to comment on the report. As a result a symposium was also organized to be held in Washington, DC. It was co-organized by the International Association of Genocide Scholars, the International Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies (A Division of the Zoryan Institute), and the Editors of Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal.

The objective of this one-day symposium was to assemble a group of experts in genocide and international human rights from various disciplines and countries to provide an independent, in-depth, scholarly review and assessment of its findings and implications. The commentaries consist of experts from at least four countries and provide a diversity of views. They range from in-depth scholarly analyses to editorial-style opinion pieces, reflecting different approaches to the report by the various commentators. Yet they provide a series of stimulating views on the task force report which may, we hope, stimulate further attention and discussion.

The symposium begins with a broad critique by Hirsch where he notes five broad problems with the report:

1. It is poorly written and filled with bureaucratic jargon.

2. It is historically inaccurate and in some discussions almost revisionist. He argues that because of this weak analysis of the recent history of genocide the report can not offer a foundation for adequate policy.

3. The report is written and edited by individuals who participated in past policy failures as their attempts to prevent genocide either failed or were not undertaken. This is part, he notes, of a “recycling” process in the capital whereby policy makers never achieve a new perspective because former members of previous administrations are recalled when a new administration enters office. Therefore, it is difficult for new and/or different views to be represented.

4. Reports by commissions often do not change policy. Sometimes they do not even influence policy. Often in government the presence of a report is pointed to as the equivalent of policy. This is a form of cooptation since in the place of action policy makers’ focus on the report.

5. He notes that the “clashing cultures” of the academy and the policy makers may contribute to different perspectives with academics taking a more analytic and critical view and policy makers arguing they are more “practical.” In any case, Hirsch argues these are critical weaknesses which must be addressed if this report is to influence policy.

Following this broad critique we move on to more specific analyses. Since the report is directed at United States policy we thought it would be enlightening to include perspectives from European and Latin American genocide scholars. Interestingly their views were quite divergent.

We begin with what might be termed a “Latin American” perspective. Dr. Daniel Feierstein, Director of the Center of Genocide Studies, Universidad Nacional de Tres de Febrero and Professor at the Universidad de Buenos Aries, Argentina argues that, “From a Latin American perspective . . . .[the report] is an interesting but confusing report.” He argues that the report is “embedded” in the values of “American society” and this makes it “difficult for outsiders to evaluate as an action plan.” His primary criticism is not so much what the report says but what it leaves out, that is, what it does not discuss “about the causes of genocide and ways of preventing it.”

In particular, he refers to what he calls the “active role played by the U.S. governments in promoting such practices in the first place.” In fact, Feierstein points out that “anyone living in a third World country in Latin America, South East Asia or Africa would find almost laughable the idea mentioned earlier that the main problem of the U.S. with regard to genocide has been ‘non-intervention.” It is a common belief in the rest of the world that the reduced U.S intervention has actually led to a ‘significant reduction in the systematic processes of mass murder in recent years.” Ultimately Feierstein believes that the report is “profoundly ethnocentric.”

While his analysis is primarily critical, Feierstein does note that there are “some positive aspects to the report. . . .” These include a willingness to broaden the definition of genocide, a call for “establishing systems of risk assessments and early warning of genocide around the world,” and preventing arms sales to places or groups where there is a risk of genocide.

Finally, he concludes by noting that any attempt to prevent genocide must address two problems: “(a) what the U.S. can and should do to prevent genocide; and (b) what the U.S. should stop doing.” Feierstein is not the only one of the commentators to note this problem with the report. His perspective as a Latin American scholar most likely makes this view much more obvious and, therefore, contributes an additional and important dimension to the analysis of the report.

A second non-U.S. analysis, which is a much less critical analysis of the report, is written by Jacques Semelin, Professor of political Science (Sciences Po Paris, Center for International Research and Studies) and founder and editor-in-chief of the online Encyclopaedia of Mass Violence, Sciences Po, 2008: www.massviolence.org.

Semelin believes that the report is an event of “great significance in the filed of genocide studies.” This is so, he believes, because it is “the first time that a group of experts, mainly former high officials, former diplomats, generals, Members of Congress, have worked together in order to propose a coherent and well-argues list of recommendations to a State so that its government will play a major role in preventing genocide throughout the world.” He does note that few genocide scholars or NGO members were consulted and he points out that the report is “an American event”—echoing Feierstein’s critique.

Semelin argues that the report is important, moreover, “an answer” to U.S. past inaction in preventing genocide and is a “way for America to say never again…” Forgetting, as others have noted, that saying “never again” has not meant that genocide will “never again” be committed. Semelin comments on the six parts of the report and concludes that there still remain significant problems. In particular, the U.S., according to Semelin, can hardly claim to be a moral or political leader in genocide prevention without joining the International Criminal Court. Semellin concludes that, while the future impact of the report can not be foreseen, it “will stand as a first and promising step.”

The third commentary, also from a European based scholar, shifts the focus to international law. Martin Mennecke is, at present, visiting professor of international law at Washington and Lee University. Mennecke views the report as a welcome addition to the growing efforts.” in the area of genocide prevention and would like to see the European institutions concerned with this subject engage in similar types of exercise. Mennecke’s basic critique is that the “treatment of international law in the Blueprint remains inconsistent and insufficient. Most often law is reduced to “international political challenges” or less than that.” He argues that it should have explored “how recent trends in international law could contribute and shape future policies in the field of genocide prevention.” Mennecke, as with most of our other commentators, notes that “overall, there is little self-critical assessment of past US policies vis-à-vis international law.” The report, he contends, is more focussed on political considerations and appears to view international law as “secondary category.”

Menneck concludes that while there are a “number of shortcomings to the report,” the report at least puts genocide prevention on the agenda.

The final comment from a non-US based scholar continues the focus on international law. William A. Schabas, Professor of Human Rights Law at the National University of Ireland, Galway and Director of the Irish Centre for Human Rights along with several other positions, is a leading international expert on international law and genocide prevention. Schabas notes that the report states that it intends to avoid the problems associated with the term “genocide,” by referring instead to “mass atrocities” which would include genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This is, as Schabas notes, an old debate and the report is misleading if it intended to examine “genocide and mass atrocity” instead of genocide alone.

These definitional issues are important, according to Schabas, because “the limitations on the definitions of crimes against humanity and genocide adopted in the aftermath of the Second World War, from the 1940s until the 1990s there were important gaps in the ability of international law to deal with atrocities.” Schabas thinks this is no longer the case because of the evolution of international law which now means that crimes against humanity address a broader range of atrocities than genocide. It also means, he notes, that “what the Albright-Cohen task force is talking about is ‘crimes against humanity’, not ‘genocide’.” Schabas, therefore, believes that the Task Force engages in a “form of deception” because “they are using one term, whose definition is well-recognized and well-accepted in international law, to replace another.” This is important, as he notes, because “words matter.”

Schabas concludes that while the report is addressed to the US government it concerns all since the US remains the most powerful nation and the report is very short on multilateralism. “Most countries,” he points out, “would expect initiatives to prevent genocide should originate from the United Nations in New York, not the Department of State and the Pentagon in Washington. . . .” Finally, Schabas concludes that the new Obama administration in Washington should not endorse the report because

“. An endorsement of the Task Force report may be a step in the wrong direction, with its exaggerated emphasis on the use of force, and its cavalier dismissal of important legal distinctions . . . . . Prevention of genocide (and of mass atrocity) will result from stronger international institutions, in particular the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, not the threat of unilateral military action by the United States.”

The three final analyses are written by US scholars of genocide. As one might expect, their views are divergent and they concentrate on different aspects of the report.

Scott Straus, a political scientist from the University of Wisconsin, Madison argues that the “contents of the report are a decisive step forward in the debate over how to prevent . . . . genocide. He believes the report is insightful and provides policy options which are “concrete and sensible.” He identifies what he refers to as “five areas of specific strengths.” These include identifying a coherent policy, providing a “comprehensive strategic approach,” making short term recommendations, identifying a “series of specific coercive and non-coercive measures that can be taken to prevent genocide,’“ and engages and incorporates “scholarship and debates in the genocide studies field” into the report.”

Even a quick reading of the discussion up to this point will make clear that Straus is at odds with some of our earlier commentators. Not only is there disagreement on his reported strengths, but some of the early analysis takes a diametrically opposed view. In fact, Straus identifies several weaknesses as well. The primary weakness, also noted by Schabas and several earlier writers in this symposium, is that the report under emphasizes multilateral action with U.S. cooperation and overemphasizes uni-lateral United States action which, as Straus notes, misses an important opportunity to reinforce international doctrine.

The second commentary from a US genocide scholar is directed at some of the unstated and faulty assumptions upon which the report is based. Alan Kuperman, Associate Professor of Public Affairs at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, at the University of Texas at Austin, notes that “good intentions may be necessary, but they are not sufficient, to prevent genocide.” The unstated and flawed assumptions upon which the report is based, constitute, therefore, according to Kuperman, a “recipe for failure.”

While the report offers “several constructive reforms,” Kuperman believes that

“Overall, however, the report ignores the most profound lessons of past failures, declines to make the hard choices on policy dilemmas, and neglects to call for the costly military reforms that could enable intervention to prevent future genocides. A more realistic assessment of these challenges gives rise to a very different set of recommendations than found in the report.”

Kuperman concludes rather starkly: “the Albright-Cohen recommendations cannot achieve their stated goal and, therefore need to be augmented..”

The final analysis of the Alrbight-Cohen Report broadens the perspective from poltical science and international law to a more philosophical anaylisis. Henry Theriault, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Worcester State College, notes that the report is based, as Kuperman also noted, on faulty assumptions and a questionable interpretation of past history. These lead to a view of genocide which is essentially limited and ‘discounts precisely the kinds of genocide that the United States and other great powers are typically involved in.” This view is tied to a more comprehensive critique in which Theriault points out that not only did the United States know genocide was being committed but actively, in several cases, supported that action. This means, According to Theriault, that “The report consistently ignores the forgetting issues, instead presenting the U.S. relationship to genocide as one of mistaken inaction and unfortunate indifference.”

In short, Theriault relentlessly points out that the report consistently misrepresents United States policy toward genocide even going so far as to ignore the founding genocide upon which the country was established—genocide of the Native Americans. This all means that without forthright acknowledging the United States’ own role in supporting and committing genocidal acts, the report is constructed on false assumptions and reconstructed history which can not serve as a foundation upon which to built a successful policy of prevention.

After additional critical analysis, Theriault concludes by offering a series of recommendations which he believes will be more likely than those in the report, to set the United States on a path toward preventing genocide.

From a simple summary reading of the commentaries it is obvious that the writers presented here have a wide range of views concerning the historical accuracy and the possible impact of the report and the recommendations it suggests. We, the editors, hope to circulate this issue with these commentaries to the original authors’ of the report and, in a future issue, invite them to respond to the analysis presented above. In this fashion, we are attempting to stimulate a dialogue between what I referred to as the two competing cultures, academics and policy makers. The success or failure of this endeavor, of course, depends upon their, the report authors’, willingness to respond and to consider the analysis presented above.

... We hope you, the reader, will look forward to these with the same anticipation for a productive debate that characterizes the editors.

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Hirsch, Herb (2009).. Editor’s Introduction. Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal [Official Journal of the International Association of Genocide Scholars]. Published by the University of Toronto]. Symposium on the Genocide Prevention Task Force Report. Volume 4, Issue 2 (August 4, 2009), 147-152.

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Never Say Never Again?

  

Gregory S. Gordon
University of North Dakota

As this century's first decade draws to a close, genocide, the scourge of the previous century, is regrettably alive and well. Is this a temporary carry-over or will the balance of these hundred years be equally bloody? Our genocide snapshot of 2008 does not provide a definitive answer. The Genocide Convention's sixtieth anniversary year was full of sober reminders that its primary goal -- prevention of genocide -- has remained out of reach. Thousands of innocents were slaughtered in Darfur; hatemongers, such as Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad kept up their calls for mass murder with impunity; and genocidal fugitives such as Ratko Mladic and Mengistu Haile Mariam were able to celebrate another year of evading justice. And what about the mass violence and death, in places such as Congo and Zimbabwe?

Given the realities, as we gaze into the future, it might seem overwhelming to promise that genocide will never happen again. But not all hope is lost. There are grounds for guarded optimism. The apprehension and punishment of certain ge'nocidaires and resolutions, reports and scholarly reminders of the world's revulsion, weariness and resolve to eradicate genocide suggest we may be headed in the right direction.

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Introduction

The Genocide Convention's sixtieth anniversary year was full of sober reminders that its primary goal – prevention of genocide – has remained out of reach. Thousands of innocents were slaughtered in Darfur; hatemongers, such as Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad kept up their calls for mass murder with impunity; and genocidal fugitives such as Ratko Mladic and Mengistu Haile Mariam were able to celebrate another year of evading justice. But not all hope was lost. Another one of the Convention's core goals – punishment – was at least partially realized. Genocide was prosecuted and roundly condemned and sanctioned in courts across the globe, including (at long last) Cambodia (even if the official charge may not have been "genocide"). And while some of the most notorious ge'nocidaires remained at large, others were apprehended (notably Radovan Karadzic), indicted and stood trial. So even if the events of 2008 may not have convinced anyone that the "never again" pledge was close to being redeemed, the international legal community could at least take some solace knowing that the fight against genocidal impunity was still being fought with great vigor and some success.

The year started off auspiciously. To honor the Genocide Convention's sixtieth birthday, the United Nations Human Rights Council in March unanimously adopted Resolution 7/25 entitled "Prevention of Genocide." The Resolution reaffirmed the significance of the Genocide Convention; called upon states that have not yet ratified the Convention to do so; re-emphasized state responsibility to prevent and protect its population from genocide; and recognized the role of the Secretary-General in dealing with early warning or prevention cases. In her first address to the Human Rights Council in September 2008, new High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay informed the Council that she would be acting upon its March request and that her office would plan a seminar on the prevention of genocide.

International Justice

It was at the end of the year, however, that the world received perhaps the most powerfully symbolic genocide legal news of 2008. On December 18th, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) convicted Rwandan genocide architect The'oneste Bagosora for his role in the 1994 massacres. As cabinet director of the Rwandan Defense Ministry, Colonel Bagosora stormed out of peace talks in Tanzania with Tutsi rebel group the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) vowing to return to Rwanda to "prepare for the apocalypse." The Tribunal had heard evidence that Bagosora was in charge of the troops and Interahamwe Hutu militia who butchered about 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus in 100 days after President Juvenal Habyarimana's plane was shot down on April 6, 1994. In convicting him on charges of genocide (and other crimes), the Tribunal sentenced Bagosora to life in prison. As part of the same "Military I" trial, fellow former officers Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva and Major Aloys Ntabakuze were also sentenced to life for genocide (and other crimes).

However Bagosora's co-defendant General Gratien Kabiligi was acquitted of genocide charges, having advanced a successful alibi defense and raised reasonable doubt regarding his alleged operational authority and targeting of civilians. The acquittal was an important reminder that international genocide trials are not mere rubber stamps of verdicts issued in the court of public opinion.

Also significant in 2008 was the arrest of Bosnian-Serb master ethnic-cleanser Radovan Karadzic. On the lam for nearly thirteen years (since the signing of the Dayton Accords in December 1995 that ended the civil war in the former Yugoslavia), Karadzic was finally captured in disguise near Belgrade on July 22, 2008. As the wartime president of the Bosnian-Serb rump state Republica Srpska, Karadzic is considered responsible for the infamous 1992-1995 siege of Sarajevo, where tens of thousand of innocent civilians were killed or wounded by sniper fire and shelling. He is also accused of orchestrating the murder of at least 7,500 Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica in July 1995 – the worst case of genocide in Europe since World War II. For this and other crimes, he was charged in 1995 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) with two counts of genocide and is currently standing trial (on other atrocity charges as well). Karadzic was jointly indicted in 1995 along with the Bosnian Serb military leader, General Ratko Mladic, who supervised Serb atrocities in the field during the 1992-95 war and directly oversaw and commanded the genocidal Srebrenica massacre. Unfortunately, as of this writing, Mladic remains a fugitive.

The week before Karadzic's capture, Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir became the first head of state to be indicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Among other charges, Bashir was indicted on three counts of genocide based on command of mass atrocity operations conducted against black African civilians in Sudan's western Darfur region. Since 2003, Sudanese government forces, with assistance from local Arab Janjaweed militias, have systematically killed close to a half million Darfuris and forced another 2.5 million to flee their homes. Bashir joined former Minister of State for the Interior, Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed leader Ali Kushayb (both charged only with crimes against humanity and war crimes) as the defendants in the ICC's Darfur prosecution, the result of a 2005 Security Council referral.

International courts brought other significant genocide news in 2008. The ICTR decision in the case of Rwandan singer Simon Bikindi is of note given incitement charges based on anti-Tutsi hate songs, such as Nanga Abahutu (“I Hate These Hutu”). Bikindi was acquitted of those charges because the Tribunal found he had written the songs before the genocide and was not responsible for their dissemination during the massacres. Nevertheless, the Tribunal found him guilty of incitement based on his traveling in an Interahamwe car from one town to another where killing was taking place. While in the car, Bikindi used a loudspeaker during his outbound trip to encourage militias to kill Tutsi. On the way back, he used the loudspeaker to ask them if they had killed the “snakes.”

On one hand, the opinion is disappointing because it failed to conduct a systematic analysis of the elements of incitement laid out in previous cases (most importantly whether the speech was sufficiently "direct" and whether it was permissible free speech or criminal advocacy – which requires examination of the text, context, purpose and relationship between speaker and subject). On the other hand, it impliedly introduced "temporality" and "instrumentality" requirements – i.e., the speech must be contemporaneous with its dissemination and should be disseminated by the speaker himself. This represents incorporation of important collateral speech-protection elements. The decision also makes clear that use of euphemisms (referring to Tutsis as "snakes") and indirect urging (asking questions) can constitute incitement.

Another ICTR genocide development of note in 2008 was the conviction of defendant Sime'on Nchamihigo – a Rwandan prosecutor in Cyangugu Prefecture at the time the Rwandan genocide began in 1994. Evidence at trial established that Nchamihigo helped plan massacres at a prefecture Security Council meeting and told Interahamwe militias to seek out and kill Cyangugu's Tutsi civilians. In sentencing him to life in prison, the Tribunal considered as very significant that he committed his genocidal crimes while serving as a prosecutor, a position of public trust in which he would be expected to uphold the rule of law.

The ICTR also convicted Protais Zigiranyirazo, the brother-in-law of former Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana (therefore a member of “Akazu” – literally the “small house” – a term used to designate the presidential entourage) and considered responsible for the 1985 murder of Gorillas in the Mist anthropologist Dian Fossey. The Tribunal found Zigiranyirazo guilty of participating in a joint criminal enterprise with the common purpose of committing genocide and extermination of Tutsi in Gisenyi prefecture, as well as aiding and abetting genocide at a roadblock in Kigali. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison.

Also in 2008, genocide was conspicuous by its absence in the first indictment issued by the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), set up to try Khmer Rouge crimes committed between 1975 and 1979. Prison commandant Kaing Guek Eav, known as “Duch,” was charged, inter alia, with crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions in connection with crimes committed while he was chief of the notorious S-21 camp, also known as Toul Sleng, where thousands of Cambodians were unlawfully detained, tortured and executed during the Khmer Rouge reign of terror. That there was no charge of genocide is noteworthy, given the common perception that operation of the Khmer Rouge's "Killing Fields" constituted genocide. However, as noted by former ECCC Principal Defender Rupert Skilbeck: "There is a very strong legal argument to say that genocide is when you kill people because of their ethnicity, whereas the vast majority of the [Khmer Rouge] purges were not for ethnic reasons, but were for political reasons." Apparently, this influenced the ECCC's decision not to try Duch for the crime of genocide.

There was also international court news for 2008 related to genocide in the civil arena. On November 18, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rejected Serbia's preliminary objections and found that it had jurisdiction, on the basis of Article IX of the Genocide Convention, to entertain the Case Concerning Croatia’s Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia). The case was initially filed in 1999 and is based on allegations of Serb atrocities committed in connection with the 1991 Serbia-Croatia war. The ICJ's decision means that the Court will yet again have occasion to interpret the Genocide Convention.

The 2007 ICJ decision in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro) had applied a relatively narrow and strict construction of the definition of the crime of genocide. Under that interpretation, the Court found that genocide had not been committed in the 1992-1995 Serbia-Bosnia war, with the exception of the Srebrenica massacre of mid-July 1995. But the Court did not find Serbia responsible for the genocide – genocide was committed but there was no ge'nocidaire as it were.

The 2007 ICJ decision came in for harsh criticism in 2008 from two articles appearing in the Fordham International Law Journal. In Adjudicating Genocide: Is the International Court of Justice Capable of Judging State Criminal Responsibility? Professor Dermot Groome complained that the ICJ's methodology, as set out in its Statute, was designed to resolve interstate disputes and remains ill suited to explore issues of individual criminal culpability – which it was called on to do in the Bosnia v. Serbia case. In Proving State Responsibility for Genocide: The ICJ in Bosnia v. Serbia and the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur, Ademola Abass, criticized the decision on the grounds that the ICJ used improper and inconsistent methodologies to determine that Serbia was not responsible for genocide (Ademola further faulted the International Commission of Inquiry for Darfur for similar reasons regarding its conclusion that Sudan was not committing genocide in Darfur).

Domestic Jurisdictions

There were also important genocide legal developments in domestic jurisdictions. Staying within the former Yugoslavia, the Bosnian War Crimes Chamber issued its first genocide verdict in July 2008. Brano Dzinic, a special police force officer of the 2nd Special Police Sekovici Squad of the Republika Srpska, was convicted of genocide related to his unit's capturing Bosnian men trying to flee the Srebrenica massacres and then participating in the murder of the Bosnians himself.

In Rwanda, conventional courts were still trying so-called "Category I" genocide cases (those in which the defendant exercised a leadership role or engaged in particularly egregious conduct) but in 2008 the government shifted thousands of the most serious genocide cases from conventional courts to community-based gacaca courts. Created in 2001, gacaca courts are semi-traditional tribunals seeking to combine restorative and punitive justice in streamlined procedures meant to handle the millions of backlogged 1994 genocide cases. Statistical information made available by the Rwandan government indicates that as of September 2008, 1,127,706 genocide cases had passed through gacaca courts and among those only 4,679 remained untried. Despite this impressive volume, Human Rights Watch has reported gacaca problems related to faulty procedure, judicial corruption, and false accusations. And in an article appearing in the Creighton Law Review, Bare Justice: A Feminist Theory of Justice and Its Potential Application to Crimes of Sexual Violence in Post-Genocide Rwanda, Megan Carpenter found that a lack of sensitivity to cultural context makes gacaca courts an inappropriate forum for crimes of sexual violence and may result in an overall justice deficit for female victims.

In Ethiopia, Mengistu Haile Mariam, the country's former military dictator responsible for the infamous "Red Terror" massacres in the 1970s, was sentenced to death on genocide charges by the Ethiopian Supreme Court. The same sentence was issued to seventeen former officials of his government. The decision overturned sentences of life in prison. In December 2006, a federal high court had convicted Mengistu and his codefendants in absentia on 211 counts of genocide, homicide, illegal imprisonment and illegal property seizure. The genocide charges stem from the Red Terror in which more than a million people were tortured and killed by the brutal Marxist regime (also known as the "Derg"). Since he was removed from power in 1991, Mengistu has lived in comfortable exile as the guest of Zimbabwe's dictator Robert Mugabe.

Focusing on the Middle East, the death sentence of the infamous "Chemical Ali" (Ali Hassan al-Majid), the cousin of Saddam Hussein and former Iraqi Interior Minister, was approved by the Iraqi presidential council in February 2008. Al-Majid was convicted of genocide in 2007 for his leadership role in the "al-Anfal campaign," which used chemical weapons and other inhumane methods to slaughter thousands of Iraqi Kurds in the 1980s. (The execution has not been carried out of yet because the executions of two of his codefendants have not been approved.)

Genocide was also the subject of numerous extradition requests during 2008. In June, an English Magistrate's court ordered four men accused of taking part in the Rwandan genocide to be extradited to Rwanda to face charges (although that order was overturned by a higher court in 2009). But a French appeals court refused to extradite two Rwandan genocide suspects to their homeland, as did a German court. More than a dozen Rwandan ge'nocidaire extradition requests were pending in other European countries in 2008, including Finland, Norway, Italy, and the Netherlands.

Domestic courts in 2008 also dealt with genocide charges contemplated for trial in their own countries. A Spanish judge in February issued arrest warrants on genocide charges for 40 Rwandan Defense Force officers (former RPF) for offenses committed against Rwandan and Congolese citizens in retaliation for the 1994 genocide. The prosecution is based on universal jurisdiction, a doctrine which permits national courts to prosecute atrocity crimes committed outside its borders by anyone (including non-nationals).

In May, the attempt of federal prosecutors and private parties civiles in Belgium to have Rwandan atrocity suspect Ephrem Nkezabera prosecuted for genocide failed when the Brussels "Chambre des mises en accusation" decided to send the case to the Cour d'Assises on war crimes charges only. The Chamber based its decision on the principle of non-retroactivity of substantive criminal law.

In August 2008, Rwanda published a report charging French involvement in the genocide and announced possible prosecution of French citizens. But the previous month, a Dutch court dismissed that portion of a civil lawsuit filed by thousands of plaintiffs against the UN based on Dutch UN peacekeepers' failure to protect their relatives in the 1995 Srebrenica genocide. The Hague District Court held that the U.N.’s immunity means that it cannot be held liable in any country’s national court.

Finally, the U.S. House of Representatives attempted to pass Resolution 106, which would have declared as a genocide the mass killing of Armenians in Turkey during World War I. But because it would have placed considerable strain on U.S.-Turkish relations, as well as Turkish-Armenian relations, the Resolution sadly went down to defeat. Nevertheless, the creation of an interagency "Atrocities Prevention Committee," to analyze and respond to possible genocide threats, was proposed by President-elect Barack Obama. It remains to be seen, however, whether this proposal will come to fruition in 2009.

Genocide Allegations and Realities

2008 also reminded the world that the legal concept of "genocide" can be politicized, devalued or simply misapplied. In September, Bolivian president Evo Morales announced the arrest of a provincial governor and political opponent on "genocide" charges in connection with the deaths of several Morales supporters during political demonstrations the previous week. Similarly, Russia claimed that Georgia committed genocide based on its August 2008 attacks in South Ossetia against pro-Russian rebel factions. Research conducted by Human Rights Watch indicates that while Georgian forces may have violated international humanitarian law, they clearly did not commit the crime of genocide. And in Kenya, in the wake of post-election violence, President Mwai Kibaki accused opposition leader Raila Odinga’s party of “unleashing genocide.” Although the violence, which left more than 1,300 people dead and 350,000 displaced, could be perceived as ethnic and systematic in nature, it did not appear to involve the intent to eliminate (in whole or in part) an ethnic group so it likely fails to rise to the level of genocide.

Similarly, large-scale violence and death in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo prompted allegations of genocide in 2008. But neither the murderous political oppression of Robert Mugabe nor the brutal territorial/resource battles among rebel groups and the government in eastern Congo seemingly implicates an intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.

In the meantime, the actual crime of genocide was still being perpetrated in 2008. The genocide in Darfur, in its sixth excruciating year, continued to result in the murder and displacement of thousands of non-Arab Darfuris by the Sudanese government and Arab Janjaweed militia. In fact, UN officials reported that between 2006 and 2008, 300,000 people died owing to the violence in Darfur and 2.5 million have been displaced. To those who would argue that the mass killing in Darfur is not genocide (because the Sudanese government lacks the necessary special intent), Jennifer Trahan in her 2008 article Why the Killing in Darfur is Genocide (Fordham International Law Journal), points to, inter alia, the enormous numbers of non-Arabs murdered, consistent patterns of discriminatory killing, ethnically charged utterances by the perpetrators during the crimes, and destruction of cultural property as evidence of the requisite genocidal intent.

And certain legal experts believe that in 2008 the crime of incitement to genocide was committed by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against the people of Israel. They point out that, starting in 2005, when he called for Israel to be "wiped off the map," and continuing to the present, Ahmadinejad has regularly urged and prophesied the elimination of the Israeli people and has variously referred to them as animals, barbarians and mass murderers. 2008 was no different. In February, for example, he told the French newspaper Le Monde that “these false people, these fabricated people [the Israeli people] cannot continue to exist . . ." As Israel celebrated its sixtieth anniversary he railed that the festivities were an attempt to forestall its "annihilation." And at one point he described Israeli Jews to supporters at a rally as a “filthy bacteria,” a “wild beast,” and a “scarecrow.”

Writings on Genocide

In my 2008 article From Incitement to Indictment? Prosecuting Iran's President for Advocating Israel's Destruction and Piecing Together Incitement Law's Emerging Analytical Framework (Northwestern University's Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology), relying on principles announced in the ICTR incitement prosecutions, I argued that Ahmadinejad's statements, anchored as they are to other direct calls for the destruction of Israel and part of an entire body of inflammatory statements made in the context of nuclear weapons development, constitute the crime of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. However, given incitement law’s track record to date, with prosecutions occurring only post-genocide, I conceded that the odds of the crime being prosecuted (through a Security Council referral to the ICC) are long. As a result, I proposed that incitement law shift its focus from punishment to deterrence and that euphemisms employed to disguise incitement, such as “predictions” of destruction, when anchored to direct calls for violence, should be considered acts of direct incitement.

Other significant genocide incitement scholarship in 2008 included an outstanding article by Susan Benesch disagreeing with my Ahmadinejad article legal conclusions. In Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide (Virginia Journal of International Law), Benesch claimed that the Rwandan cases have resulted in an ill-defined offense and called for a new six-prong incitement test that would inquire, inter alia, whether the speaker has authority or influence over the audience and whether the audience has the capacity to commit genocide. But Audrey Golden's Wake Forest Law Review comment, Monkey Read, Monkey Do: Why the First Amendment Should Not Protect the Printed Speech of an International Genocide Inciter, contended that the American First Amendment, which she believes likely prevents any United States domestic prosecution of incitement, should be interpreted so as not to apply to members of a totalitarian society sponsoring genocide.

In contrast to the United States, in countries such as Canada and France, free speech values are tempered by laws that prevent promotion of hatred (including Holocaust denial). Two significant articles appearing in the Spring 2008 Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution addressed this issue (the product of a genocide denial symposium). In their articles A Constitutional “Right” to Deny and Promote Genocide? Preempting the Usurpation of Human Rights Discourse towards Incitement from a Canadian Perspective and Taking Denial Seriously: Genocide Denial and Freedom of Speech in the French Law, Karen Eltis and Sevane Garibian cited to Canadian and French law in arguing for restrictions on free speech in the case of at least certain types of genocide denial, based, among other things, on the responsibilities that accompany freedom of speech and the damage to democracy of genocide denial.

As part of the same Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology issue in which my Ahmadinejad article appeared (a symposium issue on international criminal law), Daniel Greenfield argued in The Crime of Complicity in Genocide: How the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia Got It Wrong, and Why It Matters that complicity in genocide (as distinct from “aiding and abetting” genocide) should be a stand-alone crime and this distinction would better serve the purpose of the Genocide Convention and the ad hoc tribunals. Greenfield's conclusion was echoed by Grant Dawson and Rachel Boynton in their Harvard Human Rights Journal article Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals.

In the meantime, Case Western Reserve University of Law organized a symposium titled "To Prevent and To Punish: A Conference Commemorating the Sixtieth Anniversary of the Genocide Convention," that yielded much excellent scholarship (which appeared in the school's Journal of International Law). Nuremberg prosecutors Henry King, Benjamin Ferencz and Whitney Harris, along with genocide expert William Schabas, contributed pieces on the development of the concept of genocide and the history of the Genocide Convention. Paul Williams, Meghan Stewart, and Juan Mendez wrote about prevention through humanitarian intervention, finding the need to implement early warning and action but noting, in light of various geopolitical forces, the failure to develop legal authority for such intervention. Related to this, Michael Kelly described the legal significance and intervention obligations of labeling a situation “genocide.” Christine Chung connected this topic to the ICC by pointing out that while the Court has fulfilled certain of its Genocide Convention obligations, it can do more to strengthen the political will of states to intervene.

Specific examples of genocide were also considered at the Case Western symposium. Robert Petit, Stuart Ford and Neha Jain evaluated whether religious genocide had occurred with respect to the situations in Tibet, Iraq and Gujarat, but found that these did not meet genocide's legal elements. Other scholars explored genocide within the context of specific court cases. John Quigley discussed the ICJ's Bosnia v. Yugoslavia decision, criticizing the World Court for failing to rely on ITCY precedent in determining whether Serbia was liable for the crime. Ra’id Juhi al-Saedi offered his unique insights as the former Chief Investigative Judge for the Iraqi High Tribunal on the investigative techniques used in that forum. And Mikhail Wladimiroff described the obstacles he had to overcome (including superior prosecution resources) as defense counsel in cases before the ICTY (Tadic) and ICTR (Musema).

American Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues Clint Williamson focused on the United States in echoing the concerns of the Case Western symposium participants regarding prevention and punishment of genocide. In U.S. Efforts to Combat Genocide and War Crimes (Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law), Ambassador Williamson identified four areas in which the U.S. government needs to improve: monitoring potential atrocities, implementing preventative measures, responding immediately to ongoing atrocities, and planning for potential accountability mechanisms.

As if responding to this, the "Genocide Prevention Task Force," sponsored by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the American Academy of Diplomacy, and co-chaired by Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, released its final report on December 8, 2008 – Preventing Genocide: A Blueprint for U.S. Policymakers. It argued that genocide is preventable (but requires leadership and political will) and made the case for why it threatens core American values and national interests. The report provided 34 recommendations, starting with the need for high-level attention, standing institutional mechanisms, and strong international partnerships to respond to potential genocidal situations when they arise. It laid out a comprehensive approach, recommending improved early warning mechanisms, early action to prevent crises, timely diplomatic responses to emerging crises, greater preparedness to employ military options, and action to strengthen global norms and institutions.

2008 also saw the publication of some important books on genocide. New editions of contemporary classics were released. Eminent French Africanist Ge'rard Prunier's Darfur: A 21st Century Genocide (Cornell University Press, Third Edition) demonstrated that for nearly all of its known history, Darfur had not been a binary society of African versus Arab. But events and Sudanese government policies in the 1980s changed this and a racial polarity was constructed where none had previously existed. This eventually led to tragic results in 2003 when the Sudanese government used its provincial "Arab" allies (now dubbed the "Janjaweed") to commit genocide against the "African" population.

Yale's Ben Kiernan, the leading authority on modern Cambodia, published the third edition of his work The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 (Yale University Press), widely regarded as the definitive history of the Khmer Rouge's "Killing Fields."

Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewitness Accounts edited by Samuel Totten and William Parsons (Routledge, Third Edition), provided accounts from the leading experts on genocides throughout history, from the Herero and Armenian cases in the early twentieth century to Rwanda and Darfur at the end of last century and the beginning of this one. Similarly, 2008 saw the release of the third edition of Is the Holocaust Unique: Perspectives on Comparative Genocide edited by Alan S. Rosenbaum (Westview Press). This volume also presented essays from distinguished scholars analyzing various instances of mass atrocity (such as the mass murder of Gypsies, Armenians, Ukrainians and Native Americans) and juxtaposing them with the Holocaust.

And a new book with an overview of genocide studies appeared for the first time in 2008. Dan Stone's The Historiography of Genocide (Palgrave Macmillan) is a guide to the development of genocide studies and a valuable assessment of the historical literature pertaining to genocides.

Ge'rard Prunier also put out a new work in 2008, Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe (Oxford University Press), which chronicled the 1996–2002 war in the Democratic Republic of Congo and its relationship with the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. A companion volume pertaining to the Rwandan genocide, Scott Straus's The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda (Cornell University Press) concludes that conventional wisdom about the causes and course of the Rwandan genocide focuses largely on the actions of the ruling elite but gives short shrift to how and why elite decisions were transformed into widespread exterminatory violence. Straus remedies this deficit by focusing on the local organization of the massacres and profiles the perpetrators themselves in considering what compelled them to commit such unspeakable acts.

Two new Darfur genocide tomes were also published in 2008: Darfur and the Crime of Genocide (Cambridge University Press) by John Hagan & Wenona Rymond-Richmond (using eyewitness reports to document and analyze the ongoing atrocities and providing analysis regarding the international community's ineffectual response) and The Scramble for Africa: Darfur Intervention and the USA (Black Rose Books) by Kevin Funk & Steven Fake (assessing the conflict and how it fits into the foreign policy of the United States).

Books came out in 2008 about less publicized genocides as well. Quiet Genocide: Guatemala 1981-1983 (Transaction Publishers), by Etelle Higonnet, reviewed the legal and historical case that genocide occurred in Guatemala in the early 1980s. In Colonial Genocide and Reparations Claims in the 21st Century: The Socio-Legal Context of Claims Under International Law by the Herero Against Germany for Genocide in Namibia, 1904-1908 (Praeger Security International), Jeremy Sarkin described the 1904-08 massacre of the Herero in South West Africa, often cited as the first genocide of the twentieth century, and explored legal questions concerning reparations to the victims' descendants.

Finally, the man who first conceived of the legal concept of genocide and brought about its international codification, Raphael Lemkin, was featured in a 2008 biography: Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention (Palgrave Macmillan). This is the first complete life of the Genocide Convention's prime mover based on his own papers. And a new edition of Lemkin's classic work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.) was also released in 2008. This is the book that coined the term "genocide" and defined it as a subject of international law. Its new edition begins with an excellent introduction by genocide scholar William Schabas that helps contextualize this watershed work.

Conclusion

As this century's first decade draws to a close, genocide, the scourge of the previous century, is regrettably alive and well. Is this a temporary carry-over or will the balance of these hundred years be equally bloody? Our genocide snapshot of 2008 does not provide a definitive answer.

There are grounds for guarded optimism. The apprehension and punishment of certain ge'nocidaires and resolutions, reports and scholarly reminders of the world's revulsion, weariness and resolve to eradicate genocide suggest we may be headed in the right direction.

But how do we square this with the murderous brutality inflicted on innocent civilians in Darfur? How do we reconcile the good omens with Iran's repeated calls for Israel's destruction? And what about the mass violence and death, in places such as Congo and Zimbabwe, that technically fails to qualify as genocide but plagues and haunts us nonetheless? Given the realities, as we gaze into the future, it might seem overwhelming to promise that genocide will never happen again. But if each of us makes a small contribution every day, the twenty-first century certainly has the capacity to eliminate this blight on humanity. Let us hope we make more progress in 2009-2010.

For her invaluable assistance related to this article, Professor Gordon would like to thank his terrific Research Assistant, Amber Hildebrandt.

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Professor Gregory S. Gordon is Director of the University of North Dakota (UND) Center for Human Rights & Genocide Studies and teaches at the UND School of Law. He earned his B.A. (summa cum laude) and J.D. at the University of California at Berkeley. Professor Gordon served with the ICTR Office of the Prosecutor, where he worked on the landmark "media" cases, the first international post-Nuremberg prosecutions of radio and print media executives for incitement to genocide. He subsequently served as a white-collar criminal prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, a Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, a Liaison to the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces, and as a Senior Trial Attorney with the Criminal Division's Office of Special Investigations, where he helped investigate and prosecute Nazi war criminals and modern human rights violators (focusing on Africa). During his time at DOJ, he was detailed to Sierra Leone to conduct a post-civil war justice assessment for DOJ's Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training. Professor Gordon has been featured on C-SPAN, Voice of America, NPR, BBC and Radio France Internationale as an expert on atrocity crimes and has presented on that subject at the U.S. Army J.A.G. School, the Harry S. Truman Presidential Museum and Library and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. In addition to contributing to the Holocaust Museum's influential "Voices on Antisemitism" podcast series, he has had the honor of speaking to members of both the British and Canadian Parliaments and sharing the dais with former U.N. Ambassadors Richard Holbrooke and Andrew Young. His scholarship, which has been published in leading international journals such as the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law and the Virginia Journal of International Law, has focused on both the substantive and procedural aspects of preventing and punishing genocide and other atrocity crimes.

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Sufi Fighters Cooperate with Somali Government

On June 13 2009, officials from the Somali interim government and a Muslim Sufi group, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a met for the first time in Mogadishu and discussed national security issues and threats posed by Islamist hardliners. The government urged the Sufi group to fight in support of the government and not just for their own political gain. Sheikh Omar, who spoke for Ahlu Sunnah militia via telephone, seemed to be in agreement.

"Our agenda is to help the government restore national security after 18 years of war," Sheikh Omar was quoted as saying by local media. He stated that Ahlu Sunnah has "no political interests or agendas."

Since 1991, Somalia has been without a functioning central government, and fighting over the last two years has left at least 17,000 civilians dead and more than one million have fled their homes. Aid workers say Somalia’s humanitarian crisis — in which a third of the 10 million population needs food aid — is the worst in the world. In a country where the fight over whether extremist Islamic law should be enforced has had such a heavy human toll, should Sufi “moderates” be hailed as the great Somali hope?

Some would have Western nations rely on the Sufis to repel more hard-core Islamists in Somalia, and possibly form a moderate Islamic government. Critics say that in an environment where demagogues use religion to conceal their true political and material ambitions, establishing another official, "preferred" theological ideology won't diminish their influence.

Initial Reluctance and Denial

The term “Sufi fighters” should be an oxymoron. Sufi Muslims are usually peaceful and avoid combat. Their form of Islam is known to stress tolerance, mysticism and a personal relationship with God, not violent jihad. In the past year, however, events in Somalia caused one group of Sufis to pick up arms.

In November and December of 2008 the Shabaab, (a hardline offshoot of the ICU which opposes the government) shot dead several Sufi students and tore apart Sufi shrines. Shortly afterwards, reports indicated that the Sufi group Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a had successfully battled the Shabaab in Guri El. Guri El is a fairly substantial commercial town in the Galbadud region, which borders Ethiopia. One week after the battle, however, the lead spokesman for Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee’a told reporters that the group was not involved in any fighting.

"The fighting in Guri El was between brothers, and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a was not involved," Sheikh Abdulkadir Somow said.

Striking a conciliatory tone, Sheikh Somow called on Islamist groups to "stop fighting each other," and appealed to then Somali President Abdullahi Yusuf and Prime Minister Nur Adde to "resolve differences."

By January 2009, however, the Sufi leaders were acknowledging their victory in battles against the Shabaab insurgents in Galgadud. "We killed dozens of the attackers, including their commander, we have also seized most of their weapons that they abandoned in fear," said Sheikh Abdullahi Abu Yusuf, spokesman for Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a.

Local Heroes

At the same time, self-proclaimed “insiders” accused Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a of being led by warlords funded and armed by Ethiopia. Perhaps these accusations were (unsuccessful) attempts to counter the local support that the Sufi group enjoys.

“We see the Sufis as part of us,” said Elmi Hersi Arab, an elder in the battered central Somalia town of Dusa Marreb, also in Galgadud. “They grew up here.”

In that town, the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamee'a have benefited from deep-seated anti-Shabaab sentiment. Dusa Marreb was under the control of the Shabaab for the better part of 2008, a period that residents describe as a reign of terror. They claim that the Shabaab assasinated more than a dozen village elders and even beheaded two women selling tea. When in December the Sufis managed to drive the Shabaab out of Dusa Marreb altogether, they became local heroes in the Galgadud region.

The Ahlu Sunnah continue to earn their reputation. In early June 2009, the group fought Shabaab forces along with allied fighters from the Hezb al-Islamiya group who tried to regain control of the village of Wahbo, near the Ethiopian border. Athough both sides suffered heavy losses, and it was reported that neither side controlled the contested village, the Ahlu Sunnah have not by any means admitted defeat. The government’s recent request for their alliance indicates that they are still a force to be reckoned with.

The rarity of Muslims rising up to fight fellow Muslims points to the relatively recent shift in the conflict in Somalia from regional or family to religious lines. One Sufi student of Islamic philosophy saw the persecution of Sufis by the more radical Shabaab as the crossing of line in the religious status quo. “We had never told the Shabaab how to worship,” he said. “But now we were under attack.”

In May 2009, a Somali named Hassan Farrah wrote an op-ed piece on Somali news site Wardheernews.com that denigrated the Shabaab. “Their myopic way of thinking lacks the basic understanding of comprehensive Al-Shari’ah. Do you really believe that Al-Shabab is willing and able to provide the above services to its subjects in Kismayo and other cities in Southern Somalia? The answer is clearly no! They are indeed cowards who are afraid of tackling economic challenges and other major humanitarian problems facing the inhabitants under their jurisdiction. Therefore, it is easy for them to chop the hands of poor people and to call this an implementation of the Al-Shari’ah.”

There is little precedent for more moderate Muslims fighting radical Muslims, and no one seems sure where it will lead. “We’re on terra incognito,” said Rashid Abdi, an analyst at the International Crisis Group, a nonprofit group that tries to prevent deadly conflicts. “Before, everything was clan. Now we are beginning to see the contours of an ideological, sectarian war in Somalia for the first time, and that scares me.”

Looking for Solutions that Suit Somalia

After so many years of conflict, Somalians long for peace, normalcy, and some kind of rule of law. Yet, like the Western leaders who try to aid one side or another, they do not agree on how to achieve those goals. Some hope that a Sufi-led government would be moderate in its application of Islam, since Sufism, in their opinion, is more congruent with Somali traditions than the Wahhabi Islam espoused by the Shabaab. Wahhabism (also know as Salafism) calls for strict application of sharia law, including separation of the sexes and harsh punishments like amputations and stonings. (In June 2009, Shabaab henchmen chopped off the right hand and left foot of four thieves in front of a crowd of 200 people in Mogadishu.)

For centuries, Somalis have practiced a traditional, elder-mediated form of justice called xeer, which, though very different from Western norms, is much milder than the Wahhabi form of sharia. In xeer, each member of a clan’s diyah or lineage group is responsible for the crimes committed by anyone else from his group. Although its origins are probably pre-Islamic, xeer upholds the basic tenets of Islamic law. Despite its imperfections and partial ineffectiveness, xeer is still seen by many as preferable to strict sharia. "Xeer will never stop being used," said Dahir Mohamed Grasi, an elder in the town of Garowe for the past 46 years.

Centrism is a Relative Concept

While some turn to traditional solutions, many Somalis have put their hope in the current government. On January 31, 2009 Islamist leader Sheikh Sharif Ahmed was elected Somalia's president, leaving him in charge of a fragile peace process aimed at ending 18 years of civil conflict.

"Very soon, I will form a government which represents the people of Somalia," he said at the time.

Sheikh Sharif, who chairs the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), was once considered a radical Muslim by the Ethiopian forces who ousted him and essentially defeated the ICU in January 2007, with the help of the US. In two short years, the situation has completely turned on its head. Ethiopian troops achieved little progress and eventually had to pull out of Somalia, according to the terms of the UN-sponsored accord of October 2008. In their absence, more radical Islamic groups, such as the Shabaab have prospered in Somalia, so much so that Sharif, once called a radical, is now seen as a centrist.

Where does this leave Somali civilians? Neither traditional structures nor any current political entity can claim to exercise established authority over the entire nation. Upon being elected, Sheikh Sharif vowed to reach out to the former transitional government as well as to the Shabaab. But the Shabaab rejected the new president’s olive branch and refused to enter into talks with the government. Now Sheikh Sharif he has asked the Sufi fighters to throw in their lot with the government, hoping that they will prove an effective ally. Yet their alliance, and the use of one Islamic group against another is sure to draw even more fire from all those who oppose the government.

Ominous Signs

In April 2009, Islamist opposition leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys returned to Somalia from Eritrea after two years in exile. Speaking to supporters in Mogadishu, Sheikh Aweys described the government of his former friend and ally President Sharif as being appointed by the enemies of Somalia. One of the founders of the ICU, Sheikh Aweys sees Sharif’s inclusiveness as a form of betrayal.

“Mr Sharif’s government was not elected by the Somali people and it is not representing the interests the Somali people,” he said. While the US labels Sheikh Aweys a terrorist, many in Somalia consider him to be the spiritual leader of all Islamist groups, and he is counted a major powerbroker in the nation. So who he chooses to align himself with matters for the future of Somalia and the fate of Somali civilians.

It does not bode well that Sheikh Aweys bitterly opposes the presence of African Union Mission (AMISOM) peacekeeping troops in Somalia. The AMISOM peacekeepers were sent in when Ethiopian troops withdrew back in the end of 2008. Aweys described the troops as “bacteria” who should leave or he would fight them. Local news agency, Garoweonline, reports that Islamist rebels have vowed to continue attacks until all foreign troops withdraw from the country and Islamic law is restored across Somalia. Such battles could prove terribly costly to non-combatant Somalis, as well.

Who will wrest control of Somalia? Will it be the hard-line proponents of sharia law, the Sufi moderates, or some foreign proxy? While Ethiopian troops wait on the borders and formerly peaceful Sufis wield arms, the lives of over eight million Somali civilians hang in the balance.

Sources: New York Times, AFP, Garowe Online, Sufi News & Sufism World Report, Al Jazeera English, Awdal News Network, Christian Science Monitor, Legal Affairs.org, Al Arabiya, Free Press International

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