"Harut Sassounian's Column"
The show is finally over! The international community is no longer buying the endless Turkish excuses for refusing to ratify the Protocols. Armenian officials, who naively believed that Turkey would open its border and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, are beginning to question the Turks' sincerity and contemplating the possibility of the Protocols' collapse.
Now the blame game starts! Whose fault is it that the Protocols are not being ratified? In my view, the Turks are the ones to be blamed for deceiving the international community all along. It was never the intention of the Turkish leaders to carry out their publicly stated plans to normalize relations with Armenia. They were simply engaged in a ploy to obstruct what they believed to be Pres. Obama's solemn pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide, and to facilitate Turkey's admission to the European Union (EU), since open borders are one of the key prerequisites for EU membership.
Without taking a single positive step, Turkey created the false impression of reconciling with Armenia, thereby dissuading Pres. Obama from using the term "Genocide" in his April 24 statement. Turkish leaders also succeeded in exploiting the Protocols to generate favorable worldwide publicity for their country.
During long and difficult negotiations, Turkey demanded that in return for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations, Armenia withdraw from Karabagh (Artsakh), set up an international commission to study the facts of the Genocide, and acknowledge the territorial integrity of Turkey.
After Russia, the United States, and Europe applied intense pressure on both sides, Armenia and Turkey made a series of compromises. Armenia reluctantly agreed to establish an ambiguous "historical commission," which was not explicitly linked to the Genocide. Armenia also had to accept a reference in the Protocols to prior international treaties that confirmed Armenian territorial concessions to Turkey, but did not specifically mention the capitulatory Treaty of Kars. Furthermore, the Protocols included a clause that called for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, implying that Armenia could no longer support Artsakh, because that would be construed as interference in Azerbaijan's domestic issues.
Since the Protocols signed on October 10 did not fulfill all of Turkey's demands, its leaders started threatening not to ratify the Protocols or open the border with Armenia until the Artsakh conflict is resolved in Azerbaijan's favor. In other words, Turkey was trying to make up for any deficiencies in the Protocols by holding their ratification hostage to its precondition on Artsakh.
The ratification of the Protocols became even more complicated when Azerbaijan began to threaten its "Big Brother" Turkey for considering the opening of the border with its archenemy -- Armenia. The Azeris wanted the Turkish blockade to continue until Armenia is forced to acknowledge Azerbaijan's jurisdiction over Artsakh. The Azeri threat of raising natural gas prices to Turkey and redirecting some of its oil to Russia made Turkish leaders even more reticent to consummate their agreement with Armenia.
To appease Azerbaijan, Turkey demanded that Russia, Europe and the United States pressure Armenia into making concessions on Artsakh. This Turkish request, however, fell on deaf ears. The international community realized that the attempt to simultaneously resolve two thorny issues -- the Artsakh conflict and Armenia-Turkey Protocols -- would lead to solving neither one!
Realizing that hardly anyone outside Turkey and Azerbaijan was supporting their demands on Artsakh, Turkish leaders set their sights on another convenient scapegoat: The Constitutional Court of Armenia. Although the Court decided on January 12 that the obligations stipulated in the Protocols complied with the constitution, it also issued several clarifications and limitations that restricted the Turkish government's loose interpretation of the Protocols.
Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu brazenly threatened to abandon the Protocols outright, unless the Armenian Constitutional Court "corrected" its decision -- an impossible task under Armenian laws! The State Dept. quickly sided with Armenia, rejecting the Turkish claim that the Constitutional Court's ruling contradicted the "letter and spirit" of the agreement Of course, the State Department's true intent was to forestall the Armenian Parliament from adding any reservations on the Protocols at the time of ratification.
Since the Chairman of the Armenian Parliament had already announced that he would not take any action until the Turkish Parliament ratified the Protocols first, the ball is now in Turkey's court. The Protocols have been collecting dust in Ankara ever since they were submitted to the Parliament on October 21, 2009. The Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Turkey had stated in their joint announcement of last August that the Protocols should be ratified "within a reasonable timeframe." Armenian officials recently reminded Turkey of that loose deadline, adding that Armenia would be forced to take unspecified counter-actions should Turkey not ratify the Protocols by February or March, at the latest!
At this juncture, neither Armenia nor Turkey is willing to back down from its recalcitrant position. Should Turkey's leaders remove Artsakh and the Constitutional Court as preconditions, they would risk not only losing Azerbaijan as an ally, but seriously jeopardize their party's majority in next year's parliamentary election. Similarly, Armenia's leaders can neither give up Artsakh nor "correct" the ruling of the Constitutional Court. No amount of outside pressure can therefore force the two governments to reverse course. That is why I believe the Protocols cannot be resuscitated!
Turkey came very close to deceiving Armenia and the rest of the world with these infamous Protocols. Fortunately, they failed before causing lasting damage to Armenia's national interests.
Reprinted from the California Courier, January 28, 2010.
While Armenia’s leaders have the right to take decisions on behalf of the country’s 3 million inhabitants, they also have an obligation to take into account the interests of all 10 million Armenians worldwide on pan-Armenian issues, such as the genocide, the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict, and demands from Turkey.
In negotiating the Armenia-Turkey protocols, Armenian officials should have shown more sensitivity to critical national issues. By signing the contested agreements with Turkey, they alarmed and deeply hurt Armenians worldwide. Thousands of angry demonstrators reacted by hurling vitriolic epithets at President Sarkisian during his October tour of the Diaspora to promote the protocols. Such confrontations, unprecedented during earlier presidential visits, reflected negatively on the authorities as well as the protesting public.
A small land-locked state faced with blockade, war, economic hardships, and enemies on both sides, can ill afford internal divisions and conflicts with its diaspora. Such discord can only please Turkish leaders who have made no secret of their scheme to split Armenia from “the radical diaspora,” thus making it easier for them to extract concessions on Artsakh, genocide recognition, and demands for restitution.
What lessons Armenians must now draw from the disheartening experience of infighting over the protocols?
1) Armenia’s leaders should exercise greater caution and sensitivity by engaging in private consultations with diasporan leaders prior to conducting negotiations and signing agreements on issues that impact the entire Armenian nation.
2) A diaspora-wide leadership must be elected to reflect properly the views of the majority of Armenians on crucial issues. Such a mechanism would facilitate the transmission of credible feedback from the diaspora to Armenia’s leaders and to governments and international organizations. Further details will be presented on this important topic in a future column.
3) Diaspora Armenians should not let disagreements with Armenia’s leadership discourage them from extending aid to the needy, making investments in the country’s economy, and visiting the homeland.
4) In addition to avoiding a split between the diaspora and Armenia, it is equally important to prevent serious divisions among diaspora organizations without stifling the healthy exchange of views and disagreements.
5) The Armenian president needs to receive expert advice on critical economic and political issues which necessitates the creation of a Council of Economic Advisors and a Council on Foreign Relations, consisting of internationally recognized experts. Furthermore, a team of international lawyers should be assembled to advise the president prior to signing international agreements in order to avoid fundamental mistakes which subsequently may have to be corrected by the Constitutional Court.
6) The Armenian government should have assigned the Diaspora Ministry to serve as an unfettered channel of communication between Armenia and the diaspora during the debates on the protocols. The Ministry could have been the mechanism through which the concerns and complaints of Armenians worldwide were relayed to the Foreign Ministry and the president’s office. After all, the Diaspora Ministry is supposed to be a bridge between the two segments of the Armenian nation. While it is true that the diaspora minister accompanied the president during his tour of several countries last October, the Ministry would have gained far more credibility had it been allowed to play a more independent role.
7) Armenian officials must realize that Turkey, given its size and strategic location, has a greater opportunity to get its views publicized through the international media than it is possible for Armenia. Therefore, any issue on which Armenians and Turks have conflicting interpretations, the Turkish version will prevail by being more widely disseminated than the Armenian point of view. That is one of the reasons why agreeing to establish a “historical commission” was not a good idea. According to Turkish officials, the commission was to review the facts of the Armenian Genocide, while the Armenian leaders stated that its objective was to assess the consequences of the genocide. Had the protocols been ratified, the Turks would have proceeded to deny the facts of the genocide and would have succeeded in blaming Armenians for undermining “the good work” of the commission.
8) The protocols, rather than helping to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey, have in fact greatly damaged the prospects of such reconciliation. Future attempts must begin with the preliminary steps of opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations rather than cramming dozens of unrelated issues and preconditions into a single agreement. True reconciliation has to be based on truth and justice, not lies and cover ups.
Reprinted with permission from the California Courier, February 2, 2010.
The show is finally over! The international community is no longer buying the endless Turkish excuses for refusing to ratify the Protocols. Armenian officials, who naively believed that Turkey would open its border and establish diplomatic relations with Armenia, are beginning to question the Turks' sincerity and contemplating the possibility of the Protocols' collapse.
Now the blame game starts! Whose fault is it that the Protocols are not being ratified? In my view, the Turks are the ones to be blamed for deceiving the international community all along. It was never the intention of the Turkish leaders to carry out their publicly stated plans to normalize relations with Armenia. They were simply engaged in a ploy to obstruct what they believed to be Pres. Obama's solemn pledge to recognize the Armenian Genocide, and to facilitate Turkey's admission to the European Union (EU), since open borders are one of the key prerequisites for EU membership.
Without taking a single positive step, Turkey created the false impression of reconciling with Armenia, thereby dissuading Pres. Obama from using the term "Genocide" in his April 24 statement. Turkish leaders also succeeded in exploiting the Protocols to generate favorable worldwide publicity for their country.
During long and difficult negotiations, Turkey demanded that in return for opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations, Armenia withdraw from Karabagh (Artsakh), set up an international commission to study the facts of the Genocide, and acknowledge the territorial integrity of Turkey.
After Russia, the United States, and Europe applied intense pressure on both sides, Armenia and Turkey made a series of compromises. Armenia reluctantly agreed to establish an ambiguous "historical commission," which was not explicitly linked to the Genocide. Armenia also had to accept a reference in the Protocols to prior international treaties that confirmed Armenian territorial concessions to Turkey, but did not specifically mention the capitulatory Treaty of Kars. Furthermore, the Protocols included a clause that called for non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states, implying that Armenia could no longer support Artsakh, because that would be construed as interference in Azerbaijan's domestic issues.
Since the Protocols signed on October 10 did not fulfill all of Turkey's demands, its leaders started threatening not to ratify the Protocols or open the border with Armenia until the Artsakh conflict is resolved in Azerbaijan's favor. In other words, Turkey was trying to make up for any deficiencies in the Protocols by holding their ratification hostage to its precondition on Artsakh.
The ratification of the Protocols became even more complicated when Azerbaijan began to threaten its "Big Brother" Turkey for considering the opening of the border with its archenemy -- Armenia. The Azeris wanted the Turkish blockade to continue until Armenia is forced to acknowledge Azerbaijan's jurisdiction over Artsakh. The Azeri threat of raising natural gas prices to Turkey and redirecting some of its oil to Russia made Turkish leaders even more reticent to consummate their agreement with Armenia.
To appease Azerbaijan, Turkey demanded that Russia, Europe and the United States pressure Armenia into making concessions on Artsakh. This Turkish request, however, fell on deaf ears. The international community realized that the attempt to simultaneously resolve two thorny issues -- the Artsakh conflict and Armenia-Turkey Protocols -- would lead to solving neither one!
Realizing that hardly anyone outside Turkey and Azerbaijan was supporting their demands on Artsakh, Turkish leaders set their sights on another convenient scapegoat: The Constitutional Court of Armenia. Although the Court decided on January 12 that the obligations stipulated in the Protocols complied with the constitution, it also issued several clarifications and limitations that restricted the Turkish government's loose interpretation of the Protocols.
Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu brazenly threatened to abandon the Protocols outright, unless the Armenian Constitutional Court "corrected" its decision -- an impossible task under Armenian laws! The State Dept. quickly sided with Armenia, rejecting the Turkish claim that the Constitutional Court's ruling contradicted the "letter and spirit" of the agreement Of course, the State Department's true intent was to forestall the Armenian Parliament from adding any reservations on the Protocols at the time of ratification.
Since the Chairman of the Armenian Parliament had already announced that he would not take any action until the Turkish Parliament ratified the Protocols first, the ball is now in Turkey's court. The Protocols have been collecting dust in Ankara ever since they were submitted to the Parliament on October 21, 2009. The Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Turkey had stated in their joint announcement of last August that the Protocols should be ratified "within a reasonable timeframe." Armenian officials recently reminded Turkey of that loose deadline, adding that Armenia would be forced to take unspecified counter-actions should Turkey not ratify the Protocols by February or March, at the latest!
At this juncture, neither Armenia nor Turkey is willing to back down from its recalcitrant position. Should Turkey's leaders remove Artsakh and the Constitutional Court as preconditions, they would risk not only losing Azerbaijan as an ally, but seriously jeopardize their party's majority in next year's parliamentary election. Similarly, Armenia's leaders can neither give up Artsakh nor "correct" the ruling of the Constitutional Court. No amount of outside pressure can therefore force the two governments to reverse course. That is why I believe the Protocols cannot be resuscitated!
Turkey came very close to deceiving Armenia and the rest of the world with these infamous Protocols. Fortunately, they failed before causing lasting damage to Armenia's national interests.
Reprinted from the California Courier, January 28, 2010.
Armenia-Diaspora Unity Must be Preserved at All Cost
In recent months, as heated debates raged on the Armenia-Turkey protocols, Diaspora Armenians reacted with frustration and anger at the damage these agreements would have caused to Armenian national interests.While Armenia’s leaders have the right to take decisions on behalf of the country’s 3 million inhabitants, they also have an obligation to take into account the interests of all 10 million Armenians worldwide on pan-Armenian issues, such as the genocide, the Artsakh (Karabagh) conflict, and demands from Turkey.
In negotiating the Armenia-Turkey protocols, Armenian officials should have shown more sensitivity to critical national issues. By signing the contested agreements with Turkey, they alarmed and deeply hurt Armenians worldwide. Thousands of angry demonstrators reacted by hurling vitriolic epithets at President Sarkisian during his October tour of the Diaspora to promote the protocols. Such confrontations, unprecedented during earlier presidential visits, reflected negatively on the authorities as well as the protesting public.
A small land-locked state faced with blockade, war, economic hardships, and enemies on both sides, can ill afford internal divisions and conflicts with its diaspora. Such discord can only please Turkish leaders who have made no secret of their scheme to split Armenia from “the radical diaspora,” thus making it easier for them to extract concessions on Artsakh, genocide recognition, and demands for restitution.
What lessons Armenians must now draw from the disheartening experience of infighting over the protocols?
1) Armenia’s leaders should exercise greater caution and sensitivity by engaging in private consultations with diasporan leaders prior to conducting negotiations and signing agreements on issues that impact the entire Armenian nation.
2) A diaspora-wide leadership must be elected to reflect properly the views of the majority of Armenians on crucial issues. Such a mechanism would facilitate the transmission of credible feedback from the diaspora to Armenia’s leaders and to governments and international organizations. Further details will be presented on this important topic in a future column.
3) Diaspora Armenians should not let disagreements with Armenia’s leadership discourage them from extending aid to the needy, making investments in the country’s economy, and visiting the homeland.
4) In addition to avoiding a split between the diaspora and Armenia, it is equally important to prevent serious divisions among diaspora organizations without stifling the healthy exchange of views and disagreements.
5) The Armenian president needs to receive expert advice on critical economic and political issues which necessitates the creation of a Council of Economic Advisors and a Council on Foreign Relations, consisting of internationally recognized experts. Furthermore, a team of international lawyers should be assembled to advise the president prior to signing international agreements in order to avoid fundamental mistakes which subsequently may have to be corrected by the Constitutional Court.
6) The Armenian government should have assigned the Diaspora Ministry to serve as an unfettered channel of communication between Armenia and the diaspora during the debates on the protocols. The Ministry could have been the mechanism through which the concerns and complaints of Armenians worldwide were relayed to the Foreign Ministry and the president’s office. After all, the Diaspora Ministry is supposed to be a bridge between the two segments of the Armenian nation. While it is true that the diaspora minister accompanied the president during his tour of several countries last October, the Ministry would have gained far more credibility had it been allowed to play a more independent role.
7) Armenian officials must realize that Turkey, given its size and strategic location, has a greater opportunity to get its views publicized through the international media than it is possible for Armenia. Therefore, any issue on which Armenians and Turks have conflicting interpretations, the Turkish version will prevail by being more widely disseminated than the Armenian point of view. That is one of the reasons why agreeing to establish a “historical commission” was not a good idea. According to Turkish officials, the commission was to review the facts of the Armenian Genocide, while the Armenian leaders stated that its objective was to assess the consequences of the genocide. Had the protocols been ratified, the Turks would have proceeded to deny the facts of the genocide and would have succeeded in blaming Armenians for undermining “the good work” of the commission.
8) The protocols, rather than helping to normalize relations between Armenia and Turkey, have in fact greatly damaged the prospects of such reconciliation. Future attempts must begin with the preliminary steps of opening the border and establishing diplomatic relations rather than cramming dozens of unrelated issues and preconditions into a single agreement. True reconciliation has to be based on truth and justice, not lies and cover ups.
Reprinted with permission from the California Courier, February 2, 2010.
